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Abstract   Predictions from the original geophysical approach to oil exploration 
and production suggest that oil production will develop according to a predeter-
mined and inflexible bell-shaped trajectory, quite independent of variables relating 
to technological development, economics, and policy. Exploring potential sources 
of elasticity in oil reserves and production, this paper offers a modification to the 
geophysical approach. Based on economic theory and modern empirical research, 
the results suggest that both reserve-generation and production is indeed influ-
enced by factors and forces of technology, economics, and government regulation. 2  
Introduction 
The sharp oil price increase over the last few years has increased the interest for 
security of energy supply in general, and for oil supply in particular. An important 
factor behind the oil price surge is strong economic growth in large parts of the 
world, but especially in newly industrialised economies like Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China. Another important factor relates to oil supply. So far, the response in 
oil supply to the latest price increase has been muted, partly due to financial pres-
sures and enhanced capital discipline among international oil and gas companies 
(e.g., Osmundsen et al., 2007; Aune et al., 2007), but potentially also due to more 
fundamental factors relating to the non-renewable nature of fossil fuels. In this 
context, it is interesting to note that the most important petroleum provinces in the 
OECD area are faced with depletion (e.g., USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and 
Norway). International companies are therefore gradually shifting their attention 
and activities toward resource-rich countries in other parts of the world (e.g. Rus-
sia, Latin-America, Africa, and the Middle East).  
Ultimately, global oil reserves are bounded by nature, with physical limits both 
to availability and production growth. One of the early proponents of the geo-
physical approach to oil exploration and production was Hubbert (1962), who ar-
gues that cumulative production is the key predictor of the rate of production. Ac-
cording to this view, the geological knowledge which has been gained in a region 
is best described by cumulative production. As the region matures, cumulative 
production will also capture the inescapable destiny of depletion. And since pro-
duction is determined by the level of reserves, reserve depletion will also cause an 
ultimate dampening of both investment rates and production. In consequence, pe-
troleum production will develop according to a logistic growth function, yielding 
bell-shaped trajectories for exploration activity, reserve additions, and production. 
The sort of production profiles generated by the geophysical approach to petro-
leum exploration and production is illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.1 
Scale economies due to learning-by-doing (e.g., Quyen, 1991; Krautkraemer, 
1998) will normally produce rapid growth in annual reserve additions from new 
discoveries in the early phase of development of a new oil province.2 As the prov-
ince matures, the average field size of new discoveries will tend down, and annual 
reserve additions will diminish. This is illustrated in the left-hand panel of Figure 
1, whereby a bell-shaped curve for annual reserve additions gives rise to an s-
shaped curve for cumulated volumes of discovered oil reserves. 
                                                           
1 The so-called Hubbert’s peak was (quite successfully) applied to predict that US oil production 
would reach its maximum around 1970. The same concept has inspired the current debate of 
Peak Oil, with high-spirited discussions about when the world’s oil production will peak. 
2 A popular analogy is found in the classic board game “Battleship”. In the early phases of the 
game, with many ships on the board, expected rewards from bombing are high, with major learn-
ing effects involved whenever a new ship is hit. However, expected marginal gains, as well as 
learning effects, drop towards the end of the game, when the majority of ships have been sunk. 3 
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Source: Stylised example based on author’s calculations. 
 
As opposed to scientists of geophysics and geology, economists like to think 
that oil production is governed by competitive companies’ maximisation of ex-
pected profits. Consequently, economists put special emphasis on the influence of 
unit costs of reserve-generation and production, market developments, and policy 
regulations. This does not imply that economists entirely neglect the geophysical 
aspects of oil exploration and production. Rather, the physical perspective repre-
sented by Hubbert’s peak is regularly taken as a point of departure, and augmented 
with models and variables based on economic theory. 
An obvious conundrum for the geophysical approach to oil production relates 
to the actual development of global reserves and production rates over the last 
decades. The fact is that proved global oil reserves have increased by 75 per cent 
since the beginning of the 1980s. Annual rates of production have increased by 
nearly 40 per cent over the same period, and remaining global reserve life has 
gone from 30 to 40 years over the last 25 year period.3 The static approach implied 
by the Hubbert curve fails in explaining this development (e.g., Lynch, 2002), and 
one important source of this shortfall relates to technological development (see 
also Watkins, 2006). Improved technologies have improved the reserve and reve-
nue potential for reserve and revenue-generation, not only from exploration activi-
ties (e.g., Managi et al., 2005), but also from new techniques for increased oil re-
covery in producing fields (e.g., Watkins, 2002). At the same time, unit costs have 
been pushed down by technological progress. New solutions for exploration, de-
velopment and production have implied a range of input-specific productivity 
gains, related to capital, labour, and energy. Economic models of oil exploration 
and production seek to embed these developments through appropriate mecha-
nisms of technological progress, and through the incorporation of technology vari-
ables in empirical research. 
                                                           
3 According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2007. 4  
When geology meets the market there are also prices involved. The supply 
from profit maximising oil companies is determined by the equation between the 
oil price and marginal cost of production. Moreover, oil is an energy bearer that 
faces varying competition from other energy bearers, like coal, natural gas, and 
hydro-generated electricity. Finally, oil companies operate in variety of input mar-
kets, with direct exposure to varying costs of capital, labour, energy, materials, 
and other commodities. Consequently, oil investment and oil supply is likely to be 
influenced not only by the oil price, but also by a range other energy prices, and 
potentially also by shifts and shocks in input markets. To some degree, these 
mechanisms are also captured by economic models of oil supply. 
Empirical studies of OPEC’s role in the oil market have generally failed to es-
tablish firm evidence of stable cartel behaviour. However, recent studies do ac-
knowledge that some sort of collusion is taking place. The current discussion is 
more about which model of imperfect competition the oil price formation adheres 
to, and to stability issues of OPEC’s market power (e.g., Smith, 2005). Whatso-
ever, industry structure and macroeconomic management may have implications 
for incentives at the operational level. If the group of OPEC is seen as a dominant 
producer of an oil oligopoly, the strategic response to a lack of investment oppor-
tunities among their non-OPEC competitors does not necessarily imply an in-
crease in OPEC investment (e.g., Aune et al., 2007). Moreover, oil investment and 
oil supply may not respond to high oil prices in countries dominated by national 
oil companies, as these companies may rather seek to stabilize government reve-
nue than to maximize profits. 
As the geophysical approach to oil production is focused entirely on the subsur-
face determinants of reserves and production, it also neglects the influence of gov-
ernment regulation. Governments play a role along the entire value chain of oil 
and gas companies. They control the access to exploration acreage, they approve 
any development project, they set the conditions for operations, and they design 
and impose systems of petroleum tax and government take. Moreover, govern-
ments also decide on how to manage petroleum resources, and not least how to 
deal with resource revenues. It follows that economic models of oil production 
also require a role for government regulation and policies. 
All in all, the geophysical approach to oil exploration and production is im-
proved if the modelling framework is extended to include processes and variables 
concerning of technology, markets, policy regulations, and market structure. Such 
an enhancement adds flexibility and elasticity to the geophysical approach. The 
result is a model that yields a better understanding of the interface between geol-
ogy and economics, with improved predictions of both reserve-generation and 
production. This combined approach is illustrated in Figure 2, where an interval of 
elasticity is added for both reserve additions and for oil production. The shaded 
areas indicate possible outcomes for oil exploration and production, depending on 
local and global factors of technology, prices, market structure, and policy regula-
tion. 
 5 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a 
brief review of previous economic research on oil exploration and production, 
with a special emphasis on empirical models. To shed light on the economic ap-
proach to reserve-generation, Section 3 gives a retrospect on exploration activities 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). A couple of empirical models are 
demonstrated in Section 4, again based on data from the NCS. Concluding re-
marks are offered in Section 5. 
Previous research 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the economic perspective on oil exploration and pro-
duction usually introduces a rightward bias in the logistic growth framework of 
the geophysical approach, as demonstrated in an empirical assessment of the ulti-
mate resource recovery by Pesaran and Samiei (1995). This implies that over time, 
resource additions tend to outpace the original geophysical estimates. In conse-
quence, this also means that production rates will stay higher for longer than sug-
gested by the simple Hubbert curve of Figure 1.  
One important source of this bias relates to technological progress. Tech-
nological progress can be addressed from two perspectives. On the one hand, 
technological advances may exert a positive influence on the success rates in ex-
ploration and on the recovery rates of production. On the other hand, the dual ap-
proach is to view technological progress as a source of unit cost improvements. 
This would imply that technological advances induce an increase in yield per ef-
fort both in exploration and production. The accumulation of information and 
competence has the potential to improve the returns from exploration (e.g., Cleve-
land and Kaufmann, 1997; Managi et al., 2005), as well as net revenues of produc-6  
tion (e.g., Farzin, 2001; Watkins, 2002). In exploration, significant technological 
advances relate to the collection and interpretation of geological information, im-
proved operational drilling efficiency, as well as new technologies for real-time 
monitoring and measurement of the well’s downhole conditions. According to 
Forbes and Zampelli (2000), technological progress increased the success rate in 
US offshore exploration by 8.3 per cent per year over the period 1986-1995. Simi-
lar advances in drilling technology are highly relevant also for production activi-
ties, as the investment in additional production wells become increasingly impor-
tant when an oil field passes its peak, and embarks on the road towards depletion. 
Towards the tail-end phase of production, advanced reservoir management is 
combined with sophisticated drilling strategies to drain the reservoirs and to 
maximise resource recovery. Based on historical figures, Watkins (2002) finds 
that reserve appreciation over the lifetime of an average oil field amounts to some 
20 per cent for the United Kingdom, and close to 50 per cent for Norway. 
Another important deficiency in the original Hubbert model is its neglect of 
market mechanisms and price effects. Even though natural resources are bounded 
by nature, they are exploited by companies who adjust their behaviour according 
to market developments and prices (e.g., Lynch, 2002; Reynolds, 2002). Empirical 
exploration models for the US oil and gas industry are surveyed by Dahl and 
Duggan (1998), who conclude that acceptable models have been obtained for drill-
ing efforts, with long-term oil price elasticities above one (see also Mohn and Os-
mundsen, 2008; Ringlund et al., 2008). However, there is reason to believe that 
drilling efficiency is also influenced by the oil price, as risk propensity in com-
pany investment is affected by its financial flexibility (Reiss, 1990; Iledare and 
Pulsipher, 1999). Based on time series data for the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 
Mohn (2008) finds that reserve additions are indeed enhanced by an increase in 
the oil price, due to responses both in effort and efficiency of exploration. His ex-
planation is that oil companies accept higher exploration risk in response to an oil 
price increase, implying lower success rates and higher expected discovery size. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a series of studies have also augmented the sim-
ple Hubbert approach to oil production with economic variables, most notably the 
price of oil (e. g., Kaufmann, 1991; Cleveland and Kaufmann, 1991; Pesaran and 
Samiei, 1995; Moroney and Berg, 1999; Kaufmann and Cleveland, 2001). The re-
search strategy of these studies has two stages. In the first stage, a reliable estimate 
is obtained for the Hubbert production curve. In the second stage, the deviation 
between observed production and the estimated Hubbert curve is modelled as a 
function of economic variables. All these studies show that economic variables are 
able to improve the quality of the original Hubbert model. However, the estimated 
oil price effects are modest, with elasticities of around 0.1 for the estimated pro-
duction rates. The standard competitive model of supply has also been applied for 
empirical cross-country studies of oil supply (e. g., Watkins and Streifel, 1998; 
Ramcharran, 2002). In general, this class of models produces positive, but modest 
price elasticities for non-OPEC countries. On the other hand, the competitive 
model fails in providing a trustworthy description of OPEC supply. 7 
The failure of competitive models in explaining OPEC supply behaviour is 
simply a reflection of the imperfect competition in the global oil market. In 1960, 
OPEC was founded to unite the interests of petroleum policies across member 
states. Since then, OPEC oil ministers have met regularly to discuss prices and 
production quotas. In 2006, OPEC countries accounted for 42 per cent of world oil 
production and 75 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves.4 Empirical studies of 
OPEC’s role in the oil market have generally failed to establish firm evidence of 
stable cartel behaviour. However, recent studies do acknowledge that some sort of 
collusion is taking place. The current discussion is more about which model of 
imperfect competition the oil price formation adheres to, and to stability issues of 
OPEC’s market power (e.g., Fattouh, 2006).5 A popular assumption for OPEC be-
haviour is the target revenue hypothesis, which implies that production is regu-
lated inversely with price to uphold a revenue level which is adequate for exoge-
nous investment and consumption needs (e.g., Alhajji and Huettner, 2000). The 
target revenue hypothesis imply that supply curves could be backward bending at 
high prices, which again could explain the muted investment response in OPEC 
countries to the current record oil price. However, as shown by Aune et al. (2007), 
net present value maximisation combined with the exploitation of market power is 
also consistent with OPEC supply and oil price formation over the last years. 
Finally, governments also exert an influence on reserve-generation and produc-
tion in the oil industry. For profit-maximising oil companies firms, profits are af-
fected by tax systems and other forms of government take. Thus, incentives at the 
industry level may be affected by the regulatory system. In an econometric study 
of US exploration behaviour, Iledare (1995) incorporates the tax system in his 
proxy for the marginal value of reserves. In exploration activities, governments 
also play an important role as the ultimate holders of exploration acreage. Access 
to exploration acreage is determined by licensing systems and policies, which 
therefore have to be incorporated in models of exploration activity and reserve-
growth. Based on data from the NCS, Mohn and Osmundsen (2008) illustrate how 
exploration drilling is stimulated by awards of new exploration acreage, and Mohn 
(2008) also find the size of average discoveries to be affected by licensing poli-
cies. Governments also play a role for the production phase of petroleum activity, 
with taxes and other systems of government take as the most notable transmission 
mechanism. As an example, a variable for pro-rationing of oil production in Texas 
prior to 1973 is included in Moroney and Berg’s (1999) integrated model of oil 
supply. In general, tax systems have the potential of reducing investments and 
production growth (e.g., Boone 1998), distorting the optimal allocation of invest-
ments along the value chain,6 and changing the distribution of capital for oil in-
                                                           
4 According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2007. 
5 See Smith (2005) for a critical overview of empirical studies of OPEC behaviour. 
6 Capital requirement along the value chain include investments in exploration activities, field 
development, efforts to increase oil recovery, processing and transport facilities, and potentially 
also marketing activities. 8  
vestment between countries. See Glomsrød and Osmundsen (2005) for a recent 
overview of these issues.  
NCS exploration and production 
The Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is a relatively young oil and gas prov-
ince. Its petroleum potential was ignited among geologists by the discovery of the 
Groningen gas field in the Netherlands in 1959. The first discovery on the NCS 
was made in 1969, and the Ekofisk field was put on stream two years later.7 A 
number of discoveries were made in subsequent years (cf. Figure 3), and these laid 
the foundations for the evolution of a new and important industry in Norway, and 
a supplying region for US and European oil and gas markets. Today, 53 NCS 
fields contribute to the total Norwegian oil and gas production at 236 M standard 
cubic metres (scm) oil equivalents (oe), with a natural gas share of some 40 per 
cent (2008). According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), total oil 
production is now expected to continue its phase of gradual decline. On the other 
hand, gas production is seen to increase for another five years from today – to pla-
teau levels of around 120 bn scm oe per year. For a thorough industry and policy 
overview of the NCS, see Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2008). 
 






















Source: Norwegian petroleum directorate. 
 
                                                           
7 A non-commercial discovery (Balder) was actually made by Exxon (Esso) already in 1967. 
However, it took 30 years of technological development to mature this discovery into a profitable 
field development project based on subsea templates tied back to a floating production and stor-
age vessel. The Balder field was put on stream in 1999 and is still producing (mid 2008). 9 
Regulated gradualism has been a guiding principle for the development of the 
Norwegian oil and gas sector. The key regulatory instrument for exploration and 
production is the production license, which gives the exclusive right for explora-
tion and production of oil and gas within a specified area, usually referred to as a 
block. Production licences on the NCS are awarded through licensing rounds, and 
licensees retain ownership for the produced petroleum. A specific number of 
blocks are announced by government, and the companies prepare applications 
based on published criteria. Based on submitted applications, the Ministry of Pe-
troleum and Energy (MPE) decide on a partnership structure for each license, and 
an operator is appointed to take responsibility for the day-to-day activities under 
the terms of the license. Typically, a production license is awarded for an initial 
exploration period that can last up to 10 years. However, specified obligation re-
garding surveying and/or exploration drilling must be met during the license pe-
riod. At completion of this kind of obligations, licensees generally retain up to half 
the area covered by the licence for a specified period, in general 30 years. 
After three decades of production, volume estimates from the Norwegian Petro-
leum Directorate (2008) indicate that 2/3 of the expected total physical oil and gas 
resources remain in the ground, nearly 40 per cent of total resources are yet to be 
matured to proven reserves and 26 per cent of total resources remain undiscov-
ered. Exploration activity and results will be important to sustain production levels 
on the NCS over the longer term.  
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Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and author’s calculations. 
 
The first exploration well was struck in the North Sea in 1966, but it took 30 
wells and three years before the breakthrough was made with the discovery of the 
Ekofisk field late in 1969. Since then, another 1,200 exploration and appraisal 
wells have been drilled, of which some 850 are classified as exploration wells (cf . 
Figure 4). With more than 600 exploration wells, the North Sea represents approx. 
¾ of total cumulated exploration activity on the NCS. 160 exploration wells have 10  
been drilled in the Norwegian Sea, whereas only 63 exploration wells have been 
drilled in the under-explored Barents Sea. As illustrated in the right-hand panel of 
Figure 4, the annual number of discoveries has largely hovered in the area be-
tween 5 and 15 over the last 20 years. However, we see a slight positive trend in 
the number of discoveries over time. To detect the sources and factors behind this 
development, the figures have to be decomposed even further.  
A simple input measure to the exploration process is offered by exploration ef-
fort, or drilling activity, as illustrated in the left-hand panel of Figure 4. A corre-
sponding output measure is offered by reserve additions per exploration well 
(yield per effort). However, exploration output can be decomposed even further, 
as reserve additions per exploration well is the product of average discovery rate 
and average field size. The historical record for these two indicators is illustrated 
in Figure 5. Over the 40-year period, the discovery rate has average 1/3, which is 
quite high by international standards. We also note that the volatility of the dis-
covery rate was high in the early phase, which is an indication of high exploration 
risk due to of inadequate information and poor experience. Over time, however, 
discovery rates seem to have stabilised somewhat, and we also note a slight up-
ward trend, which probably can be attributed to the accumulation of competence, 
experience, and technological progress.  
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Source: Norwegian petroleum directorate and author’s calculations. 
 
The right-hand panel of Figure 5 reports annual averages for the size of new 
discoveries. In their pursuit of maximum return, oil companies rank exploration 
prospects according to value potential, and target the structures with the highest 
potential first (Iledare, 1995; Dahl and Duggan, 1998). This is one explanation 
why the early phase of an oil province is usually dominated by large discoveries. 
However, government policies also played an important role for this development, 
as the early phase of the NCS history was characterised by regular licensing 
rounds, with a continuous supply of virgin exploration acreage with high potential. 11 
Finally, the high oil price level and an overconfident oil price outlook may also 
have induced oil companies to increase their exposure to overall exploration risk 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. This would also imply (lower expected discovery 
rates, and) a higher expected field size. 
Over the last years, the NCS has gradually entered a more mature phase. Explo-
ration efforts have been weak over the last years, and reserve additions from ex-
ploration have slowed to a trickle (cf. Figure 3). Oil production has passed its 
peak, gas production is approaching its plateau, and there is no line of imminent 
new field developments. On the other hand, the record-high oil price provides a 
strong stimulus for investment to enhance recovery from producing fields. To sus-
tain investment and production over the longer term, the NCS will ultimately de-
pend on new reserve additions from exploration. Both authorities and companies 
see a high potential for gas discoveries in the deepwater areas off Mid Norway, 
but so far, the establishment of a proven exploration play for this area is still pend-
ing (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2007).8 Access to new exploration acreage 
with high potential in vulnerable waters off Northern Norway could be important 
to enhance the NCS reserve base. Due to environmental concerns, the issue of new 
awards in Northern Norway has developed into a highly controversial issue. How-
ever, an extrapolation of the Norwegian approach to petroleum management sug-
gests that a political consensus will be reached, and that the industry will continue 
its gradual quest into Northern waters. 
A simple model of NCS exploration 
The reserve concept is one of the factors that distinguish non-renewable re-
source industries from other industries. Due to this defining characteristic, oil 
companies engage in extremely risky exploration activities to support and grow 
their base of oil and gas reserves, and to sustain production activity over the 
longer term. Among the oil companies, the set of exploration opportunities is sub-
ject to continuous evaluation and management based on a range of criteria relating 
to geology, technology, economic factors, and government policies. The result of 
this balancing act is a dynamic exploration strategy. Moreover, the implied portfo-
lio of exploration drilling activities yields a certain average finding rate, a particu-
lar distribution of discovery size, and ultimately, a specific rate of gross reserve 
additions. Consequently, the data we observe for efforts and efficiency in oil ex-
ploration are formed by simultaneous decisions in each company. This simultane-
ity should be appreciated also in economic models of the exploration process. 
                                                           
8 An exploration play is a geographically bounded area where a combination of geological fac-
tors suggests that producible petroleum can be discovered. The three most important factors are 
1) a reservoir rock where petroleum can be preserved, 2) a tight geological structure (a trap) that 
covers the reservoir rock, and 3) a mature source rock containing organic material that can be 
converted into petroleum (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2007). 12  
Drawing on Mohn (2008), an empirical modelling approach to exploration behav-
iour will now be outlined, along with some results for time series data from the 
NCS.  
The exploration process represents the traditional source for reserve additions. 
Based on sophisticated insight on the underground, exploration wells are directed 
at various layers that presumably hold oil and/or gas resources, according to dif-
ferent exploration plays. Exploration drilling may take place in virgin areas, where 
undiscovered deposits are potentially, and where the base of accumulated informa-
tion and experience is correspondingly small. Alternatively, companies may focus 
their exploration in areas where fields have already been developed, with a sig-
nificant base of competence and experience, and with access to well-developed in-
frastructure for processing and transport. Exploration in frontier areas represents 
higher risk than in mature areas. Within the companies, this risk is balanced 
against expected return in the management of the total exploration portfolio.  
Based on standard principles from neoclassical theory for producer behaviour, 
exploration activity may be represented by a standard production function, 
whereby inputs and technological progress are transformed into reserve additions. 
With profit maximisation as the key behavioural assumption, such a model trans-
forms into an optimal supply plan, where expected reserve additions depend on 
the oil price (Pt) and a set of state variables for geology (depletion; Ht), technology 
(Zt), and government regulation (Et). Having tested a range of alternatives, our 
preferred model includes cumulated exploration drilling activity as a proxy for de-
pletion (Ht). Over the years, the collection of seismic data has grown exponen-
tially on the NCS, reflecting the accelerating diffusion of increasingly advanced 
techniques for more efficient exploration activities. Accordingly, seismic survey-
ing activity (Zt) is included among our explanatory variables to capture techno-
logical progress. Finally, exploration efforts and efficiency is influenced by the 
availability of exploration acreage, which is subject to government regulation. 
Consequently, our model also includes the volume of open exploration acreage 
(Et), which will be influenced by both licensing rounds (ΔEt > 0) and relinquish-
ments and license expiration (ΔEt < 0).  
We also bear in mind that reserve additions do not depend solely on efforts, but 
also on output. To this end, we apply a useful decomposition introduced by Fisher 
(1964), who demonstrated that annual reserve growth (Rt) can be seen as the prod-
uct of exploration effort (Dt), the average discovery rate (St), and average discov-
ery size (Mt). With explanatory variables grouped in the vector Xt = [Pt, Ht, Zt, Et ], 
this yields for annual reserve addititions: 
 
      . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t t t X M X S X D X R ⋅ ⋅ =     (1) 
 
Equation (1) illustrates three sources of reserve additions, which all can be influ-
enced by geology, technology, economics, and regulation. Consider the impact on 
reserve additions from an increase in the oil price. This will depend not only on 
how an oil price shock affects drilling activity (Dt), but also on its influence on the 13 
discovery rate (St) and average field size (Mt). The relation between these factors 
is again a result of the management of exploration portfolios within each oil com-
pany. To describe these mechanisms more precisely, define 
R
P ε  as the percentage 
increase in annual reserve additions caused by an oil price increase of one percent. 
Equation (1) now implies that this total elasticity can be represented by the sum of 










P ε ε ε ε + + =      (2) 
 
Thus, the impact of an oil price increase depends directly on how such an increase 
affects each of the three components of annual reserve generation. Corresponding 
elasticities apply for the other explanatory variables. 
Applying simultaneous estimation techniques, Mohn (2008) now estimates the 
various elasticities implied by Equations (1) and (2). Specifically, the empirical 
model has three endogenous variables (Dt, St, Mt), and is specified as a vector er-
ror-correction model, whereby changes in dependent variables are regressed on 
changes in explanatory variables, as well as the deviation from an underlying 
equilibrium relation between the model variables. Estimation is based on Full-
Information Maximum Likelihood (Johansen, 1995), as implemented in PcGive 
10. 
 















Oil price Licensed acreage Seismic surveys Depletion
0.44
 
Estimated partial and total elasticities by explanatory variable (per cent) 
*) 
*) FIML estimates obtained with PcGive 10. 
a) Semi-elasticity: percentage change in reserve generation from abs. change in depletion indicator. 
Source: Mohn (2008). 
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Key results for persistent elasticities are summarised in Figure 6. The estimated 
long-term parameters illustrate the percentage impact on annual reserve additions 
from an increase in the explanatory variables of one per cent. Moreover, Figure 6 
also illustrates how the combined elasticities of reserve growth with respect to ex-
planatory variables may be decomposed, with partial attributions from drilling ef-
forts (D), discovery rate (S), and average discovery size (M).  
In terms of specific effects from explanatory variables, maturation and deple-
tion (Ht) has a highly significant (p = 0.00) 9 dampening effect on annual reserve 
additions, according to the estimation results. The main mechanism for this proc-
ess is that the average field size falls over time, which is also evident from Figure 
5. Seismic surveying activity, our proxy for technological development, has as 
mixed effect on the exploration process. The estimated total effect of this variable 
on reserve additions is small, and statistically insignicant (p = 0.61). However, the 
results do imply that seismic surveying activities contribute significantly to the in-
crease over time in discovery rates (p = 0.00), as indicated in Figure 5. 
Results for the oil price (Pt) illustrate the richness in economic effects from the 
proposed modelling framework, with statistically significant parameter for all the 
involved partial effects, as well as for the total effect (p = 0.00). Reserve additions 
are stimulated by an increase in the oil price, not only because drilling activities 
are spurred, but also because of positive effects on exploration efficiency – or 
yield per effort. Discovery rates are suppressed when the oil price increases, ac-
cording to the econometric results. On the other hand, the estimated model estab-
lishes a positive and highly significant link between the oil price and average dis-
covery size, an effect which dominates the estimated reduction in the discovery 
rate. This is a clear indication that oil companies adjust their portfolio of explora-
tion activities according to changes in economic and financial conditions (Reiss, 
1990). In times of high oil prices, high cash-flows and high risk appetite, compa-
nies seem to tilt their exploration activities towards risky areas (frontier explora-
tion), with relatively low discovery rates, and with high expected discovery size. 
When oil prices are low, cash flows are constrained, and the risk appetite is more 
modest, exploration strategies are typically more cautious. Consequently, explora-
tion efforts are reduced, and focused in areas with higher discovery rates – and 
smaller expected field sizes (mature areas).10 
                                                           
9 In testing of statistical hypotheses, the probability value (p-value) of a parameter estimate 
represents the likelihood of obtaining a result as extreme as the one obtained through our estima-
tion, given that the null hypothesis is through. In our notation (p = 0.00), the implication is not 
that the p-value of this parameter estimate is actually 0, but that it fails to break zero at the two-
digit cutoff level of measurement. 
10 As opposed to frontier exploration areas, mature areas are typically characterized by proven 
exploration models, producing fields, well-developed infrastructure, transport facilities and mar-
ket access. Moreover, exploration activities in these areas are usually directed at smaller satellite 
fields which can be tied back to already producing facilities of larger reservoirs (in decline), 
without the large investments involved by stand-alone field developments in new oil and gas re-
gions (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2007). 15 
Finally, the estimated model for the exploration process on the NCS also pro-
vides a significant role for government policies, as represented by access to explo-
ration acreage. An increase in total licensed exploration acreage of 1 per cent, will 
produce an increase in annual reserve additions by 0.44 per cent (p = 0.00), ac-
cording to the results. This effect has two sources. First, a modest increase in drill-
ing activity is sustained when new acreage is offered. Second, new licensing 
rounds have a positive effect on average discovery size. With drilling efforts fo-
cusing on the most prospective available blocks at any time, it is natural that new 
licensing rounds will result in higher average discovery size. 
The presented model leaves the impression that variables relating to technol-
ogy, economics and government regulation play a significant role for reserve addi-
tions on the NCS. Moreover, the outlined modelling approach provides a better 
representation of the complexity and sophistication the exploration process than a 
simple geophysical approach. Consequently, the study by Mohn (2008) lends sub-
stantial support to the hypothesis that economic variables contribute to the expla-
nation of oil exploration and production behaviour. To illustrate this point more 
candidly, the presented model is re-estimated with the depletion indicator (Ht) as 
the only explanatory variable.  
 
Table 1. The contribution of economic variables to overall model quality 
Test statistics for model reduction 
 
  LL SC HQ  AIC 
Presented model  26.50  0.42  -1.20  -0.47 
Reduced model  -2.88  0.86  0.66  0.55 
 
Table 1 reports the implied changes in estimated model quality, evaluated 
through the log-likelihood ratio (LL), as well as the Schwartz (SC), Hanna-Quinn 
(HQ), and Akaike information (AIC) criteria. These latter three criteria of model 
selection may be seen as goodness-of-fit measures for comparisons of different 
time series models based on the same data set. See Dornik and Hendry (2001) for 
theoretical background, technical detail and specific procedures for standard speci-
fication tests and model diagnostics in PCGive 10. At this point, we remind that an 
increase in the log-likelihood ratio (LL) is an indication of improved statistical 
power of the model, whereas a model improvement is generally associated with a 
reduction in the three other reported test criteria for model selection (SC; HQ; 
AIC). From Table 1 we clearly see that a disregard of economic variables yields a 
reduction in the log-likelihood, and increase in the other criteria of model selec-
tion. This confirms the preference for a combined model, and an appreciation of 
economic variables in the exploration process. 16  
A simple model of NCS production 
Previous research on oil and gas production suggests that economic variables 
may also improve the explanation of production activity. To test the impact of 
economic variables on extraction levels, Moroney and Berg (1999) propose and 
estimate a simple econometric model on data from the United States. Not surpris-
ingly, they find that a combination of economic and geophysical variables provide 
an explanation which outperforms its alternatives, both in economic and statistical 
terms. Based on the framework of Moroney and Berg (1999) a model will now be 
outlined to perform a similar test on production data from the NCS (cf. Figure 3). 
As in the previous section, we first specify a model that contains both physical 
and economic variables. We then remove the economic variables, and compare the 
two model versions using both economic interpretation and statistical criteria of 
model selection. Consider a competitive firm that produces oil according to a 
well-behaved neo-classical production function  ) , ( H L F Q = ,11 where Lt represent 
a vector of variable inputs and Ht is a vector of state variables, including reserve 
variables, technological conditions and government policy. Maximisation of prof-
its (Π) now implies that the following restricted profit function can be derived: 
 
{ }
, ) , ( . .
max ) , , ( ,
Q H L F t s
L W Q P H W P L Q
≥
⋅ − ⋅ = Π = Π
  (3) 
 
where P is the price of oil, and W is the vector of input prices. Previous literature 
suggests that the role of traditional inputs is dominated by other factors in the 
process of oil and gas exploration and production (e.g., Dahl and Duggan, 1998; 
Farzin, 2001; Mohn, 2008). The attention of this modelling exercise will therefore 
be focused on potential variables of the H vector, and the vectors of variable in-
puts and their prices are neglected for simplicity of exposition.12 In this example, 
we are especially concerned with the role of economic variables (P) as opposed to 
geological variables. Consequently, the H vector of this sketchy application will 
therefore be earmarked for variables of reserve development and depletion. 
In our approximation of an empirical specification for oil production, we now 






H H P A H P γ β
α + = Π = Π     (4) 
 
                                                           
11 With a long-term perspective on the production process, all inputs may be seen as variable. 
Consequently, the capital stock can be included in both the L and the H vector, depending on the 
horizon of the decisions in question. 
12 To test the validity of this assumption, a variety of interest rate and labour cost variables were 
included in preliminary estimations. However, plausible and robust estimates could not be estab-
lished for any of their coefficients. 17 
Observe that a squared term is included for the depletion mechanism, to allow for 
potential non-linearities in the process of resource exhaustion. Hotelling’s lemma 
now allows the derivation of optimal oil supply directly from Equation (4). Partial 
differentiation with respect to the oil price now yields: 
 
] exp[






     (5) 
 
where  A A ~ ~ α =  and  1 ~ − =α α , Ht is a depletion indicator, proxied by accumulated 
production, and α, β, and γ are the coefficients to be estimated. 
Introducing small-caps for natural logs, as well as a time index t, we now spec-
ify the econometric model as a simplified error-correction representation of Equa-
tion (5):13 
 
t t t t t t u H b H b p b q q + + + + = Δ − − − −
2
1 2 1 1 1 0 1 λ     (6) 
 
The underlying structural parameters of Equation (3) can be calculated directly 
from the estimated parameters of Equation (6).14 The lag structure of Equation (4) 
implies a gradual adjustment to oil price changes which is consistent with adaptive 
price expectations (cf. Farzin 2001). A simple form of expectations formation is 
therefore encompassed by the error-correction specification. This specification 
also removes problems due to non-stationarity in the model variables, and secures 
dynamic balance among variables in the econometric equation. Equation (6) may 
therefore be estimated by ordinary least squares.  
Based on annual time series data over the period 1972-2004, we obtain: 
 
) 00 . 0 (
2
1
) 00 . 0 (
1
) 00 . 0 (
1
) 00 . 0 (
1 19 . 0 95 . 0 38 . 0 41 . 0 ˆ − − − − − + + − = Δ t t t t t H H p q q    (5) 
 
The estimated model is well-behaved, and meets the requirements implied by 
standard specification tests. All parameters are highly significant in statistical 
terms, as indicated by the p-values (in brackets). The lagged production level ex-
erts a negative influence on production growth, according to the estimated model, 
implying a slowdown in production as long as production increases. Observe also 
that our depletion indicator takes a positive coefficient, suggesting that production 
growth is actually stimulated by cumulated production. However, this stimulation 
is modified by the negative and highly significant coefficient on the squared de-
pletion term. In sum, the standard properties of the geophysical approach seem to 
                                                           
13 The error-correction specification would normally also include changes in model variables. 
However, these proved insignificant in preliminary estimations, and are therefore left out for 
simplicity of exposition. The constant term is also removed for the same reason. 
14 Letting all changes approach zero, Equation (4) can be solved for qt to obtain α = - b0/λ, β = -
 b1/λ, γ = -b2/λ (Bårdsen, 1989). 18  
be fairly well captured by Equation (5). Observe also that the oil price takes a 
positive coefficient. This indicates that production levels on the NCS are signifi-
cantly influenced by this key economic parameter. To study the contribution of 
economic variables to our explanation of NCS production growth, we now reesti-
mate the model, leaving out the price of oil. This yields: 
 
) 33 . 0 (
2
1
) 61 . 0 (
1
) 30 . 0 (
1 03 . 0 17 . 0 05 . 0 ˆ − − − + − = Δ t t t t H H q q     (6) 
 
The first impression is already that Equation (6) provides a quite miserable expla-
nation of production activity compared Equation (5). All parameters approach 
zero, they change signs, and none of them are significant in statistical terms.  
 
Table 1. The contribution of economic variables to the production model 
Test statistics for model reduction 
 
  LL SC HQ  AIC 
Model with oil price  0.77  0.38  0.26  0.20 
Model without oil price  -19.21  1.48  1.39  1.35 
 
The standard criteria of comparison is the squared multiple correlation coefficient 
R
2. However, as the constant term was removed from our preferred model based 
on statistical inference, R
2 is no longer well-defined.15 The equation standard error 
provides a better statistic for model comparison, as this measure is adjusted for 
degrees of freedom. For Equation (5), we obtain an equation standard error of 
0.25, whereas the corresponding estimate for Equation (6) is 0.45. This suggests a 
clear preference for the model represented by Equation (5). To conclude even 
more rigorously, Table 2 compares the common battery of specification tests for 
statistical performance. As for the exploration models in the previous section, Ta-
ble 2 reports changes in estimated model quality, evaluated through the log-
likelihood (LL), as well as the Schwartz (SC), Hanna-Quinn (HQ), and Akaike in-
formation (AIC) criteria. These indicators are the same as applied for the explora-
tion model above. See Dornik and Hendry (2001) for details on their properties. 
We remind that an increase in the log-likelihood ratio (LL) is an indication of im-
proved statistical power of the model, whereas a model improvement is generally 
associated with a reduction in the three other reported test criteria for model selec-
tion (SC; HQ; AIC). Again, we see that a disregard of economic variables yields a 
                                                           
15 R
2 also has a range of weaknesses with respect to model evaluation. The inclusion of addi-
tional variables will never reduce the value of R 2 2 2, and it may improve even if nonsense variables 
are adjoined. Moreover, R
2 also depends on the choice of transformation of the dependent vari-
able (for example, Δy versus y). R
2 may therefore be misleading for model evaluation purposes. 19 
substantial reduction in the log-likelihood, and increase in the other criteria of 
model selection. Consequently, we should prefer a combined model. In summary, 
the value and importance of economic variables in models of petroleum activity is 
further corroborated. 
Concluding remarks 
Empirical research in petroleum economics has demonstrated again and again 
that predictions based on the geophysical approach to oil exploration and produc-
tion gives a poor representation of actual development of the last 50 years or so. 
The typical pattern for individual fields, regions and provinces is that exploration 
activities uncover far more oil reserves than is thought possible in the initial esti-
mates. Moreover, the accumulation of technology, experience and competence 
also makes it possible to recover more oil from each producing field than implied 
by the static traditional geophysical approach to oil extraction.  
My two applications are based on data from the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 
an oil province whose development is characterised by gradualism and govern-
ment regulation. New insights into the complex process of oil exploration are ob-
tained through the combination of physical and economic variables in an inte-
grated dynamic time series model. As an example, the results imply that additions 
to the reserve base is affected by the oil price, not only because drilling efforts are 
spurred when the oil price increases, but also because the output of the drilling 
process is influenced by prices, cash-flows and adjustments to the exploration 
portfolio in each company. The presented model of NCS oil exploration suggests 
that companies increase their exposure to exploration risk when the oil price goes 
up, yielding lower discovery rates, and higher average discovery size. On the other 
hand, a reduction in the oil price makes oil companies more cautious. A low oil 
price makes them focus exploration activities in less risky (mature) areas. The re-
sult is higher discovery rates, and smaller discoveries. In the same model, reserve 
depletion exerts a dampening effect on reserve growth, partly offset by the posi-
tive impact of seismic suveys on discovery rates. Through the design and execu-
tion of licensing rounds and awards of new exploration acreage, the expected re-
serve and production potential on the NCS is also affected by government policy. 
Awards of new exploration acreage give a stimulus to reserve additions due both 
to enhanced drilling efforts and improved drilling efficiency, according to the re-
sults. 
A simple econometric example for NCS oil production also suggests that eco-
nomic variables play a significant role in the explanation of production levels. The 
preferred econometric model of oil supply includes a positive and highly signifi-
cant parameter for the real oil price, indicating an own-price elasticity of oil sup-
ply above 0.9, which is high by comparable standards. As for the exploration 
model, we also find the estimated model of production to deteriorate when this 20  
simple economic parameter is left out of the equation. A variety of specification 
tests and standard statistics of model fit and clearly suggest that simple geophysi-
cal models are outperformed by models which also include economic variables.  
In summary, modern economic research has established a firm role for eco-
nomic variables in models of oil exploration and production. The importance of 
technology, economics and policies to supplement the geophysical aspects of oil 
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